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Introduction
The intensified flows of goods, services, peoples and ideas across borders
intrinsic to globalization have had multiple and multifaceted effects. Those
affecting culture have perhaps been the most controversial, and certainly
the most politically and even emotionally charged. The ‘trade and culture’
quandary, or, to phrase it perhaps more revealingly, ‘trade versus culture’
quandary, is a discussion that emerged in the forum of the WTO and its insti-
tutional predecessor, GATT. As is well documented, GATT came into being after
World War II as a provisional agreement that was meant to eliminate trade dis-
crimination and reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade, and over the years
it grew into a de facto international organization with a substantial impact
on trade-related issues (Jackson, 1997; Matsushita et al., 2006). The way in
which the organization advanced its goals of liberalizing trade and opening up
domestic markets was through the so-called ‘negotiation rounds,’ during which
the GATT members agreed to make concessions and establish rules to which
they subsequently found themselves committed. The ‘trade and culture’ debate
became truly conspicuous during one of these rounds of trade negotiations –
the Uruguay Round – which was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1986
and lasted until 1994. It was during this period that a number of countries, with
France and Canada prominently featuring at the forefront, fought the so-called
‘exception culturelle’ battle. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the
proponents of the cultural exception policy, their strategies and demands, and
to explore how they came to be reflected in the law and policy of the WTO. The
chapter also looks at the current state of affairs because, although the WTO law
has not undergone any substantial amendments since its entry into force in
1995, the media landscape has in the meantime been truly transformed, in
some aspects in a revolutionary manner. The broader picture of global gov-
ernance has not remained still either, with new and emergent powers, and
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changing mechanisms of rule-making and -taking (Cottier & Delimatsis, 2011;
WTO, 2011).
Sketching the origins of the cultural exception discourse
Although the idea of state protection of cultural identity is not exceptional
and has existed for many years, possibly going as far back as the origins
of sovereignty (Petito, 2001), the real policy debates about the relationship
between trade and culture began only after World War I.1 This has to do
with both the changing nature of the medium and with that particular period
in history. In the former sense, although the printed media, such as books,
newspapers and magazines, were the first manifestation of the industrializa-
tion of cultural production, they had relatively low tradability, mostly due to
their cultural specificity and the use of local language, which made them less
appealing to a critical mass of consumers outside the domestic market (Footer
& Graber, 2000, pp. 116–117). Audiovisual media, especially film, in contrast,
proved more suitable for engaging and appealing to a broader audience. After
World War I the initial predominance of European cinema had subsided and
Hollywood had clearly become the new center of global film-making, exporting
visual entertainment in vast amounts (Trumpbour, 2007; Bruner, 2008; Singh,
2008). As a reaction to this shift of power and fearing both the economic and
cultural impact of Hollywood, many European governments introduced mea-
sures to protect their domestic film industries, mostly in the form of import
and screen quotas. These measures found expression in the ‘Special Provisions
Relating to Cinematograph Films,’ which became part of GATT 1947. Article IV
thereof permitted quotas for ‘the exhibition of cinematograph films of national
origin during a specified minimum proportion of the total screen time,’ while
preserving GATT’s general ban on quantitative restrictions on imports (Arti-
cle XI). The screen quotas were ultimately short-lived but Article IV of GATT
is symptomatic of the sought-after (and accepted by GATT members) cultural
exception, as well as of its narrow focus on audiovisual media, in particular film,
which, before convergence, has been the domain most immediately affected by
imports and accordingly most burdened with measures of domestic support.
The idea that some measures protecting national cultural industries may be
justified was also reflected in bilateral and regional fora. In 1988 the cultural
exception proponents celebrated a major victory when Canadian negotiators
introduced a ‘cultural exclusion’ clause in the Canada–US Free Trade Agree-
ment (CUSFTA).2 Five years later, such exclusion was also included in the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which incorporated by ref-
erence CUSFTA in Annex 2106.3 It should be noted, however, that this cultural
clause was coupled with a retaliation provision that significantly limited by
design its practical use: while cultural industries could be exempted from the
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agreement, either party could ‘take measures of equivalent commercial effect in
response to [such] actions’ (CUSFTA Article 2005; also Cahn & Shimmel, 1997).
The cultural exception proponents attempted to transplant these localized
‘successes’ into the multilateral context. The tension between trade and cul-
ture has intensified at this point of time, as technology – especially satellites –
increasingly facilitated the diffusion of cultural content, not only in film but
also in television, thereby also reducing the efficiency of existing national pro-
tectionist measures. Another important reason for the particular intensity of the
cultural exception battle fought during the Uruguay Round had to do with the
round’s special mandate and the significance of its outcomes. It was not simply
aimed at dismantling tariff barriers but was a much further-reaching undertak-
ing that ultimately led to the establishment of the WTO with a new structure
and an impressively effective dispute-settlement mechanism in comparison
with any existing international adjudicative body (Jackson, 1997). The WTO,
which became operational on 1 January 1995, included domains that were pre-
viously unaffected by international trade regulation, most notably intellectual
property (by means of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)) and services (by means of GATS).
While the proclaimed ultimate goal of the European Communities4 and
Canada was to exempt any product or service that is culture-related from the
rules of the negotiated WTO agreements5 (hence exception culturelle), the main
focus of their efforts was in fact on the exclusion of audiovisual services. Pur-
suant to the technical classification scheme, which WTO members applied
during the negotiations and in tailoring their concessions, these included
motion picture and videotape production and distribution services; motion
picture projection services; radio and television services; radio and television
transmission services; and sound recording (WTO, 1991). Reflecting this nar-
row focus of the tension, during the Uruguay trade talks, a Working Group on
Audiovisual Services was established. Its essential task was to consider whether
the special cultural considerations related to the audiovisual sector demanded
its total exclusion from the scope of the services agreement, or whether a dedi-
cated annex to the agreement would provide a solution. The opinions differed
profoundly, and even the somewhat more diplomatic vernacular of trade repre-
sentatives could not conceal the chasm between those in favor of free trade and
those in favor of shielding (national) culture. While Canada and audiovisual
media exporters, such as India, Brazil and Hong Kong, were important actors
(WTO, 1990a), it is noteworthy that the greatest clash on media matters was
between the EU and the USA (Singh, 2008, p. 122 and passim).
Although the EC itself has limited powers in cultural affairs, as the core com-
petence remains with the member states (Craufurd Smith, 2004, 2011), it has
more leeway in the field of audiovisual services.6 The TWF Directive, adopted
in 1989, is an expression of this and has become the centerpiece of the evolving
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and expanding European media policy (Burri, 2007; Harrison & Woods, 2007).
Noteworthy in the context of the present discussion is that despite being
essentially a liberalization instrument, the TWF Directive contained two spe-
cific provisions (articles 4 and 5), which were the only tools at the EU level
per se meant to serve cultural goals by ensuring a balance of offerings in the
EU broadcasting markets. Article 4 of the TWF Directive calls upon member
states to ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters
allocate a majority of time on television channels to European-made programs
(the so-called ‘European works’). Article 5 of the TWF Directive is intended to
ensure that a minimum proportion of viewing time (10 per cent) is reserved
for European works created by independent producers, or alternatively that
a minimum program budget is allocated to independent productions. The
European Community was undoubtedly keen to preserve these quotas (Burri,
2007; Attentional et al., 2011) and thus to make them permissible at the inter-
national level (Burri, 2009). Generally, the EU sought to secure sufficient wiggle
room for cultural policy measures to be taken at both the European Community
and the member state levels.
The EU pursued these goals by relying on a set of arguments relating to
the specific qualities of cultural goods and services. This underlying strategy
has been typical of the EU’s positioning in global governance debates bear-
ing on culture, and it became truly fully fledged after the end of the cultural
exception battle and in its conceptual and institutional transformation into
a cultural diversity policy (Burri, 2010a). At their very basis, such policies are
built around the two-pronged axiom that some sort of additional regulation
is indispensable in markets for cultural goods and services because they fail,
and that the ensuing market failures can be corrected through state inter-
vention.7 These economic rationales have been strengthened in the political
context by the (surprisingly) enduring negative attitude towards globalization
and its effects, including those upon culture (Held et al., 1999; Cowen, 2002;
Giddens, 2002). More concretely, the cultural identity line has been prominent
in the tactics of the EU – on the one hand by emphasizing the importance of
the audiovisual industry to European identity and unity, and by highlighting
the harmful effects of the US entertainment industry on the other (Singh, 2008,
pp. 132–133).
The EU sought to ensure that in liberalizing audiovisual services, their cul-
tural specificities would be respected, by means of an annex (WTO, 1990).
Audiovisual services, defined fairly broadly, were to be exempted to a sig-
nificant extent from the obligations of most-favored-nation (MFN), national
treatment and market access (WTO, 1990) – that is, from the core non-
discrimination duties and progressive liberalization rationale, which underlie
the entire multilateral trade system. It is fair to say that the EU was not com-
pletely united in this approach and there were various opinions within the
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European Community, with France being very proactive and Germany and the
UK somewhat reluctant (Singh, 2008, pp. 122–123). Yet the EC, headed at the
time by Jacques Delors, acted as a strong policy entrepreneur, reflecting as well
as shaping the views of the member states (Ross, 1995, p. 115; Levy, 1999;
Singh, 2008, p. 127). The framing of the audiovisual service matter has had
a positive feedback effect and boosted European cultural identity as a shared
value and a policy objective (Goff, 2000, 2007; Singh, 2008, pp. 133–134).
The USA, fervently lobbied by the entertainment industry (Grant & Wood,
2004, pp. 352–376; Singh, 2008, pp. 134–138), matched the European offen-
sive. The USA was opposed to any cultural exception, regardless of whether
the exception was part of the overall framework agreement or confined to
audiovisual services. Its strongest argument was that of disguised protectionism,
especially considering the intrinsic difficulty of defining ‘national’ and ‘cul-
ture.’ It also stressed consumers’ freedom of choice, as well as other positive
effects of free trade in cultural products (WTO, 1990a). Being cautious about
pushing too far on the cultural identity issue, the USA had been consistent in
framing the whole debate as one on trade rather than culture (Singh, 2008,
pp. 134–135).
The cultural exception discourse is particularly interesting as an expression
of media policy at the global level. One reason is the high stakes involved in
resolving the audiovisual services quandary, as it almost turned into a stum-
bling block for the entire multilateral trade agenda (Graber, 2004), which had
been designed as a ‘single undertaking’ and accordingly demanded agreement
by all on all issues. One must also bear in mind, however, that the audiovisual
sector was only one deal among many, and there were trade-offs and other
interests within the WTO bargaining process and outside it for parties on both
sides of the trench line (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Singh, 2008).
The law of the WTO and the agreement to disagree
Eventually the cultural exception agenda only partially achieved its goals.
On paper, the text of the WTO Agreements includes no cultural exception of
any kind. Such a reading does not, however, reveal the practical reality of lib-
eralized services markets and of the policy options available. Shortly before
the adoption of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, the EU and
the USA agreed to disagree on addressing cultural matters without striking any
concrete deal.8 This would have long-term implications for both the law of
the WTO and for future endeavors to shape cultural toolkits at all levels of
governance.
The gist of the Uruguay Round results in the field of services is that while no
services sector is excluded from GATS (except for services supplied in the exer-
cise of governmental authority, Article I:3(b)), there are a number of flexibilities
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built in, which allow in effect the lesser opening up of certain sectors, which
are sensitive to domestic constituencies (Galt, 2004). Compared with GATT,
which regulates trade in goods, GATS offers substantially more wiggle room
for national policy-makers and is less aggressive in terms of opening markets.
While under GATT, obligations regarding national treatment, which basically
prohibit discrimination between like domestic and foreign products, and the
ban of quantitative restrictions apply across the board, the GATS framework
adopted a ‘bottom-up’ (or ‘positive list’) approach. Thereby WTO members can
choose the services sectors and subsectors in which they are willing to make
market access (Article XVI of GATS) or national treatment (Article XVII of GATS)
commitments, and can define the modalities of these commitments. Even the
MFN obligation – that is, the duty to treat equally all like foreign services and
services suppliers, which is fundamental to the entire trade system – can be
subject to limitation under GATS (Article II:2).
As a result of this malleability in design and in spite of the considerable
economic gains to be reaped from the liberalization of audiovisual media ser-
vices (Roy, 2005, p. 941; Singh, 2007), almost all members, with the notable
exception of the USA, Japan and New Zealand, have been reluctant to commit
and have listed significant MFN exemptions (Roy, 2005; WTO, 2010). Indeed,
audiovisual media is the least liberalized services sector. The EU and its mem-
ber states have made no commitments (WTO, 1997) and tabled a number of
MFN exemptions, relating mostly to the extension of national treatment to
audiovisual works covered by co-production agreements and support schemes,
such as the MEDIA program (WTO, 1994).
What is particularly interesting when looking at the members’ commitments
for audiovisual services, and most illustratively those of the EU, is that they
reflect a resolute ‘all-or-nothing’ approach. The substantial scheduling flexibil-
ity permitting a variety of commitments ranging between full liberalization
and absolute non-commitment is not made use of. This is odd because for sub-
sectors where government regulations and trade restrictions are not common,
such as sound recording, there is still a ridiculously low level of commitment.
In a more systemic sense, this is odd because the very goals of an international
trade agreement are compromised:
Indeed, absence of commitment in a given sector, while it remains an
option, means that a Member can, at any time, take whatever market-access
or national treatment limitation [ . . . ] This absence of any guarantee of open-
ness stands in stark contrast to the economic and trade importance of the
[audiovisual] sector (and in particular its intensive use of technology and
creativity) as well as the importance of the predictability and stability given
by commitments – that is, the certainty that certain restrictions won’t be
maintained or introduced in the future.
(Roy, 2005, pp. 940–941)
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Despite this state of affairs, which permits almost unlimited possibilities for
measures protecting domestic cultural industries and/or discriminating against
foreign products and services, in political terms, the scope for domestic mea-
sures regarding trade in culture has not been found sufficient. The Uruguay
Round’s ‘Agreement to Disagree’ was a mere ceasefire that offered no real solu-
tion for the cultural proponents. The progressive liberalization commitment
incorporated into GATS (Article XIX) was impending and the MFN exemptions
made were at least theoretically limited in time, although countries have not
taken this recommendation earnestly.9
The general exceptions available under articles XX of GATT and XIV of GATS,
which could justify measures otherwise violating the WTO norms in the respec-
tive products and services trade domains, were deemed insufficient to provide
appropriate consideration of the pursuit of cultural objectives. Article XX(f) of
GATT was the notable exception because it was designed to exempt measures
for the protection of ‘national treasures of historic, artistic, or archaeological
value.’ The scope of the provision was, however, thought to be too limited and
of little use when contemporary creative production, such as films or television
programs, was at stake. Furthermore, the norm had no counterpart under GATS
and could not help when services were affected. A particularly hard blow to
the cultural exception backers had been the Canada – Periodicals case,10 which
signaled the unwillingness of the WTO adjudicative bodies to engage in bal-
ancing trade versus culture values, as the case was decided by the panel and
the Appellate Body to the benefit of the USA by focusing narrowly on the core
trade issue, and despite CUSFTA’s cultural exception clause.
Doha Round developments
One could maintain that the post-Uruguay status quo has been a de facto cul-
tural exception, albeit not cast in law and under the constant pressure of further
liberalization. This has prompted the cultural exception proponents to look for
solutions outside the WTO and resulted in the change of venue to UNESCO
under the more positive but also more ambitious agenda of cultural diversity
(Burri, 2010a). This regime-shifting, which resulted in the successful adoption
of the 2005 UNESCO convention, is well documented and aptly discussed
elsewhere in this book.
In the meantime, although the intensity of the trade versus culture clash
within the WTO seems to have subsided, few changes can be expected. The
Doha Development Agenda, launched in 2001 (WTO, 2001), as the next round
of trade negotiations, originally intended to be completed by 2005, is proof
of this. Although Doha is not stalling because of audiovisual media services,
the present state of requests and offers for the sector reveals precious few new
commitments and no future-oriented rules design. The EU is adamantly pursu-
ing its non-committal approach (WTO, 2005), despite the many requests by
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other WTO members to address the status quo either by full commitments
in market access and national treatment, or by more targeted actions, such as
binding of the current level of market opening or commitments under specific
subheadings – commonly, film production, distribution and projection services,
and sometimes sound recording (WTO, 2010).
Implications beyond audiovisual services and beyond Doha
Despite the recognition widely shared by key WTO members that the
audiovisual sector has changed dramatically (Graber, 2004, pp. 166–170; Roy,
2005, pp. 931–936), in particular in the face of the convergence of information
technology, telecommunications and media services, companies and sectors,
and of the sweeping transformations caused by the Internet, there is little
agreement on the way forward. The cultural exception debate has been per-
petuated and has had multiple (arguably negative) effects outside the domain
of audiovisual services, as initially narrowly construed. This is particularly evi-
dent in the discussions about advancing liberalization and coherent global
regulation in the ‘neighbouring’ areas of telecommunications and electronic
commerce (Burri, 2009), which mirror the legacy line of separation between
the EU and the USA.
In line with its cultural exception strategy, the EU zealously argues that ‘Elec-
tronic deliveries consist of supplies of services which fall within the scope of
the GATS’ (WTO, 2000), and seeks to ensure that all digital media fall within
the category of audiovisual services (WTO, 2006) – thus retaining its flexibil-
ity for MFN exemptions and limited commitments. This position of the EU
has been adopted in the context of its overall global trade and culture agenda
(European Commission, 2007), as well as in relation to the modernization of
the TWF Directive (now the AVMS Directive),11 to include on-demand media
services too, and to prescribe soft cultural quotas for them (Burri, 2007). The
USA takes the opposite position and has sought the deepest mode of lib-
eralization available – that is, that of GATT, coupled with the Information
Technology Agreement (WTO, 1999). The opposing agendas of the EU and
the USA allow no straightforward solution – an unfortunate situation, which
has been exacerbated by the insufficient ability of the WTO law to adapt to
rapid technological changes due to the intrinsic characteristic of the WTO as a
‘member-driven’ organization (Davey & Jackson, 2008). Specifically in the field
of services, this is also due to the underlying and now largely outmoded services
classification scheme (Weber & Burri, 2012; Tuthill & Roy, 2012). For instance,
as the law currently stands, online games as a new type of cultural content
platform could be fitted into the discrete categories of computer and related ser-
vices, value-added telecommunications services, entertainment or audiovisual
services (Wunsch-Vincent, 2006, p. 71), each of which implies a completely
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different set of duties and flexibilities. The electronic commerce instance is
illustrative of the negative spillovers of the cultural exception debate, which
prevent any practical solution in the short to medium term and leave the
vital economic field of digital trade in a haze of uncertainty (although the
US – Gambling rulings12 have confirmed that WTO rules are applicable to elec-
tronically supplied services). The lack of a solution within the multilateral
context of the WTO has also prompted members to take other, bilateral or
regional, paths to advance their policy priorities (Wunsch-Vincent & Hold,
2012), and, overall, has led to increased fragmentation of rules and complex-
ity in governance, which may render the protection of global public goods,
such as cultural diversity, more difficult (Maskus & Reichman, 2005; Brousseau
et al., 2012).
Manifold proposals have been advanced in the literature to solve the ‘culture
versus trade’ conundrum and make it more like ‘culture and trade’ (Burri, 2009,
pp. 45–54). One important cluster of suggestions attempts to find the appropri-
ate linkage between the law of the WTO and the UNESCO convention, seeking
mutual supportiveness between the two regimes and the attainment of some
legal certainty through the ‘harder’ adjudicative mechanisms of the WTO (e.g.,
Graber, 2006). Another key group suggests the ‘renovation’ of some WTO rules,
whether culture-specific or not, to make the law of the WTO more suitable
for the simultaneous advancement of trade liberalization and of public interest
goals of importance to members and the international community (e.g., Voon,
2007a, 2007b). Next to the various points of critique one could formulate with
regard to these proposals (Voon, 2007b; Burri, 2009), a common feature is that
none of them appears readily practicable, to a large extent due to the strong
path dependence in the cultural exception, as well as in the ‘culture as com-
modity’ discourses, which renders any trade and culture debate a ‘dialogue of
the deaf’ (Roy, 2005).
This is particularly regrettable as it obstructs innovation in legal engineer-
ing, which would have been possible in the new digital media environment,
as it has immediately impacted on the markets for cultural symbols, and has
transformed the very ways in which we create, distribute, access, use and reuse
cultural content – the ways in which we participate individually or as part of a
group in cultural processes (Benkler, 2006). In particular, some features of the
digital media environment – such as i) unlimited ‘shelf-space,’ abundance of
content and its different organization in cyberspace; ii) new ways of distribut-
ing, accessing and consuming content; iii) new modes of content production,
where the user is not merely a consumer but is also an active creator – could be
seen as paths for overcoming the current stalemate in trade and culture debates,
and for striving for cultural diversity with measures that are not designed as
trade barriers or other plain mechanisms of blocking foreign and financing
national content (Burri, 2010b, 2012b).
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Concluding remarks
The cultural exception debate has been triggered by advancing globalization
and the increasing difficulty of reconciling economic and non-economic objec-
tives, national sovereignty and global responsibilities. The discussions have
been heavily politicized and reached their pinnacle in the Uruguay Round
of negotiations, which marked the highest degree of institutionalization of
economic globalization at the international level with the establishment of
the WTO in 1995. The cultural exception strategy has only partly achieved
its goals – although the law of the WTO does not contain any exception for
cultural goods and services, it permits flexibilities in particular in the field of
services, which allow WTO members to shield some sensitive sectors from lib-
eralization. The cultural exception proponents, led by the EU, have used this
opportunity to the fullest, specifically in the audiovisual services sector. Media
services is the sector with the lowest level of commitments.
Little has changed since the conclusion of the Uruguay talks in 1994, which
is odd since we are now faced with a completely transformed media landscape.
This may have led, among other things, to the inadequacy of the existent
policy measures aimed at achieving (national) cultural objectives, to negative
spillovers to other policy domains and to an overall incoherence in governance.
Unfortunately, very few of these problems have been appropriately addressed
in the ongoing Doha Round of negotiations, and it is unlikely that they will be
resolved even under the highly optimistic scenario of a successful close of the
Doha Round, as the cultural exception legacy endures. The mismatch between
the ‘old’ cultural exception policies and the practical reality of contemporary
media is exacerbated by the changes in global governance, characterized by ail-
ing multilateralism, intensified forum-shopping, proliferating preferential trade
agreements, the repositioning of traditional world powers and the emergence
of new and stronger global actors, to name but a few trends (Jackson, 2007;
Cottier & Delimatsis, 2011; WTO, 2011). The novel modes of cybergovernance,
such as unilateral state action with global effect, regulation through intermedi-
aries, regulation through code and technology in general, only compound the
existing complexity (Benkler, 2006; Lessig, 1999, 2006; Burri, 2012a). Against
this backdrop, any future solution to the trade and culture quandary appears
unlikely in the forum of the WTO alone and would have to match the com-
plex reality of multilevel, multidomain governance in the attempt to reconcile
economic and non-economic objectives.
Notes
1. The overview here is limited to policy dimensions of the trade versus culture
quandary. To be sure, this clash has been the subject of various sociological,
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philosophical and cultural studies enquiries, such as, notably that of the Frankfurt
School (Footer & Graber, 2000).
2. Canada – US Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987–2 January 1988, 27 ILM 281
(1988).
3. NAFTA, 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 289 (1993). The cultural exception exists only
between Canada and both the USA and Mexico, but not between the USA and
Mexico. In practice, this provision offering comfort to the Canadian cultural sector
has had little effect.
4. It was the ‘European Communities’ and not the European Community or the EU,
which signed the WTO Agreements. This was due to some questions regarding
the competence of the European Community in external affairs, which was sub-
sequently clarified (Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994, concerning
the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its
competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotia-
tions (1986–1994), OJ L 336/191, 23 December 1994). As of 1 December 2009, which
signifies the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the name used in the WTO is the
European Union.
5. The law of the WTO is contained in several agreements, attached as annexes to the
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. GATT, GATS and TRIPS are contained
in Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement. Other annexes concern additional aspects of
liberalization, such as the dispute-settlement procedure (Annex 2), the trade policy
review mechanism (Annex 3) and certain plurilateral agreements (Annex 4).
6. Following the principle of subsidiarity, the European Community is to encourage
cooperation between member states but could, if necessary, supplement its action in
certain fields, notably in ‘artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual
sector’ (Article 151(2) of the EC Treaty, now 167(2) of the TFEU).
7. Failures typical of markets for cultural goods and services are those due to i)
economies of scale in production and distribution; ii) the nature of competition in
products with substantial public goods aspects; iii) the impact of externalities on the
pricing of cultural products; and iv) collective action problems (Sauvé & Steinfatt,
2000; Baker, 2001).
8. As legend would have it, early in the morning of 14 December 1994, just before
the US president’s Fast Track Authority was to expire, Leon Brittan, as EU represen-
tative, offered the US trade representative (USTR), Mickey Kantor, a deal to bind
the television quota at 49 per cent as part of an audiovisual services agreement and
to continue negotiations on box office receipt taxes in France, as well as on blank
video and audiotape taxes. After discussions with Bill Clinton and Hollywood rep-
resentatives, the US turned the deal down. Instead of signing something which the
lobbies at home would have opposed, the USTR walked away and the Europeans
made the infamous MFN exemptions from GATS (Preeg, 1995, p. 172; Singh, 2008,
pp. 135–136).
9. The GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions states that, ‘In principle, such [MFN]
exemptions should not exceed a period of 10 years. In any event, they shall be subject
to negotiation in subsequent trade liberalizing rounds.’ The exemptions made should
have thus, in principle, expired in 2005; many members’ lists have nonetheless
defined the exemption’s intended duration as indefinite.
10. WTO Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada –
Periodicals), WT/DS31/R, adopted 14 March 1997; WTO Appellate Body Report,
Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada – Periodicals), WT/DS31/AB/R,
adopted 30 June 1997.
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11. Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March
2010, on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in member states concerning the provision of audiovisual
media services (AVMS Directive), OJ L 95/1, 15 April 2010.
12. WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/S285/R, 10 November 2004, confirmed
by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005.
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